Too often, doing philosophy is modeled after fighting a battle or making war. Arguments are attacked, shot down (like a plane), or sunk (like a ship). Theses are defended, defeated, or demolished (like the walls of a city), and ideas (like people) are killed and destroyed. There are problems with doing philosophy in this way. This approach is unfair and undercuts the possibility of reaching truly justified views. Fortunately, there is a peacemaking alternative to this combative way of doing philosophy. This alternative seeks to determine the most justified philosophical views while maintaining:
- Fair-mindedness, which puts the most favorable interpretation on the views of one’s philosophical opponents,
- Openness, which reaches out to understand challenging new philosophical perspectives, and
- Self-criticalness, which requires modifying or abandoning one’s views should the weight of available evidence require it.
Grounding Morality in Rationality
A key challenge in social and political philosophy is to examine the possibility of grounding morality in the widely shared norms of rationality. This requires more than simply showing that morality is rationally permissible, as that would imply that egoism and immorality were also rationally permissible. What needs to be shown is that morality is rationally required, thereby excluding egoism and immorality as rationally permissible.
Kurt Baier, in his recent book The Rational and the Moral Order, attempts to bridge the gap between egoism and morality by interpreting morality as a system of mutual benefit. According to Baier, moral reasons apply only when there exists an adequate enforcement system that makes acting against those reasons unprofitable. Baier argues that morality does not require altruism or self-sacrifice but only requires that people act upon reasons of mutual benefit. In his view, morality and egoism do not conflict, as moral actions are driven by rational self-interest.
However, this defense of morality falls short because it redefines morality in a question-begging way, rendering it compatible with egoism and sidestepping any requirement for altruism or self-sacrifice.
Alan Gewirth’s Argument for Moral Rights
In search of a non-question-begging justification for morality, Alan Gewirth proposes a different argument. He suggests that all agents regard their purposes as good, and therefore, all agents must affirm a right to the freedom and well-being necessary to achieve their purposes. This leads to the conclusion that every agent has a universal moral right to freedom and well-being, and others ought not to interfere with the exercise of that right.
The success of Gewirth’s argument depends on interpreting this universalized right as a moral right. However, an alternative interpretation suggests that the right is prudential, not moral. Prudential rights are action-guiding only for the rightsholder, not for others, and do not imply that others should refrain from interfering. As such, Gewirth’s justification for morality fails, as it relies on the moral interpretation of the right, which can be disputed.
A Non-Question-Begging Justification of Morality
My own defense of morality follows a similar strategy to that of Baier and Gewirth but introduces altruism as a crucial element to show that egoism is contrary to reason. This argument is grounded in the idea that each of us can entertain both self-interested and moral reasons, and the task is to determine which reasons we should accept as rational.
The philosophical question here is not about what reasons we should publicly affirm but about what reasons we should accept at the deepest level—our heart of hearts. For people capable of acting both self-interestedly and morally, the task is to avoid question-begging by granting the prima facie relevance of both self-interested and moral reasons.
Resolving Conflicts Between Self-Interest and Morality
When self-interested and moral reasons conflict, three potential solutions emerge:
- Priority to self-interested reasons,
- Priority to altruistic reasons,
- A compromise that sometimes prioritizes self-interest and sometimes prioritizes altruism.
The third solution, a non-arbitrary compromise, is the rational choice because it avoids the question-begging nature of exclusive prioritization. The compromise must respect the rankings of self-interested and altruistic reasons, which will vary based on the individual’s circumstances.
Morality as a Non-Arbitrary Compromise
Morality can be seen as a non-arbitrary compromise between self-interested and altruistic reasons. In cases where self-regard is morally acceptable, high-ranking self-interested reasons take precedence over low-ranking altruistic reasons. Conversely, morality limits the extent to which people should pursue their own self-interest, giving priority to high-ranking altruistic reasons when necessary. This balanced approach prevents the extremes of both egoism and pure altruism, offering a rational framework for moral decision-making.
The Debate on the Justification of Morality
Most contemporary philosophers do not try to justify morality by rationality alone. Instead, they argue that morality is grounded in moral values such as liberty, fairness, equality, or the common good. These values are often seen as incommensurable, leading to radically different practical requirements. Some philosophers take a pessimistic view, suggesting that incommensurable values lead to irreconcilable differences, while others are more optimistic, hoping for partial agreement on practical requirements.
One way to resolve this debate is to examine social and political perspectives, such as libertarianism, which seem to have minimal practical requirements. If the practical requirements of such perspectives can be shown to overlap with those of other philosophical ideologies, it may be possible to reconcile them at a practical level. For example, if the libertarian ideal of liberty could be shown to align with the welfare liberal’s ideal of fairness or the socialist’s ideal of equality, it could help reconcile these different perspectives in practical terms.
Conclusion: Towards Practical Reconciliation
The peacemaking model of philosophy aims to provide the strongest justification for practical requirements. A key step in this model is to examine the possibility of reconciling alternative social and political philosophies. By demonstrating the practical commonalities between seemingly opposed perspectives, it may be possible to bridge the gaps and find shared ground. This approach offers a hopeful, constructive way forward in the pursuit of moral and philosophical understanding.